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Thursday, July 23, 2020 | History

2 edition of Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring found in the catalog.

Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu

Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

by Dilip Abreu

  • 260 Want to read
  • 40 Currently reading

Published by Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University in Stanford, Calif .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Game theory.

  • Edition Notes

    Statementby Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti.
    SeriesEconomics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 487, Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 487., Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
    ContributionsPearce, David., Stacchetti, Ennio.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination35 p. ;
    Number of Pages35
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL22409414M

    Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Econometrica. (5) Optimal unemployment insurance § Hansen, G. and A. Imrohoroglu. The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard. Journal of Political Economy (1): – ♠ § Hopenhayn, H. and J. Nicolini. 'James Morrow uses game theory to show that the laws of war enable states to align their expectations about the use of violence during war, and he tests his theory with an exhaustive data set. Order within Anarchy is the best theoretical and empirical analysis of a body of international law that I have read.

    Repeated Games [Game Theory] Chapter 5. Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information." Econometr no. 3 (): – Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.". "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring" (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometr , "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model" (with Chris Phelan), Econometr , "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality" (with John Geneakoplos and David Pearce), Games and Economic Behavior 1, ,

    @inproceedings{CabralAsymmetricEI, title={Asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games with many players}, author={Lu{\'i}s M. B. Cabral}, year={} } Luís M. B. Cabral Published Economics Abstract We show that in symmetric games with many players, an . Repeated games • Repeated games: given a simultaneous-move game G, a repeated game of G is an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves in which a history is a sequence of action profiles in G. I will denote the repeated game, if repeated T times, as GT. • G is often called a stage game(阶段博弈), and GT is called.


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Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring by Dilip Abreu Download PDF EPUB FB2

Econometrica, Vol. 58, No. 5 (September, ), TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING BY DILIP ABREU, DAVID PEARCE, AND ENNIO STACCHETTI1 This paper.

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring Article (PDF Available) in Econometrica 58(5) February with Reads How we measure 'reads'.

This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in external equilibria. We characterize these equilibria, and provide computational and comparative statics results.

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring. BibTeX @MISC{Abreu90towarda, author = {Dilip Abreu and David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti}, title = {Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring}, year = {}}.

These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing our earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. The bang-bang theorem is strengthened to a necessity result: under certain conditions, efficient sequential equilibria have the property that after every history, the value to players of the remainder of the equilibrium must be an extreme point of the equilibrium value set.

This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria.

Title: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring Created Date: Z. Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Abstract. This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in external equilibria.

are generalized to asymmetric. Repeated Games a) Imperfect Public Observations. GT Section Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stachetti [] “Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometr [HOLLIS through JSTOR] Athey, S., K.

Bagwell [] “Optimal Collusion with Private Information,” RAND. Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti. Towards a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica – CrossRef Google. We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring.

The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting.

Repeated Games II: Imperfect Public Monitoring Jonathan Levin May We now take up the problem of repeated games where players’ actions may not be directly observable. This is a rich class of problems, with many economic applications. Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti () and Fudenberg. Abreu D, Pearce D, Stacchetti E () Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

Econometrica – MathSciNet zbMATH CrossRef Google Scholar 4. Get this from a library. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. [Dilip Abreu; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti].

all equilibria has yet to be obtained. This is in sharp contrast to the theory of repeated games with perfect or imperfect public monitoring, where complete charac-terizations of all equilibria have been obtained.

The present paper provides valuable general methods to verify equilibrium conditions in repeated games with private monitoring.

game with imperfect private monitoring by constructing review strategy equilibria as lenient behavior with long-term punishments, in which we permit the monitoring technology to be arbitrarily inaccurate.

Eventually, Sugaya () proved the folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring for a very general class of infinitely repeated games, by. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring.

Author links open overlay panel Michele Piccione 1. Pearce, E. StacchettiToward a theory of discounted repeated gamed with imperfect monitoring.

Econometrica, 58 (), pp. CompteCommunication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring (Ch1, 2 of M&S) Dynamic Programming Approach • ** D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (), “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica • M.

Cronshaw. continuous-time game. Keywords: Continuous-time game theory, Stochastic optimal control, Weak convergence 1.

Introduction In this paper we study a class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring which has been introduced in a continuous time framework in the important contribu-tion by Sannikov (). Beige Book Research We conduct world-class research to inform and inspire policymakers and the public.

Notes on the Aps Example in "Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring" Notes on the Aps Example in "Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring" Share.

Facebook LinkedIn.“Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns.” and E. Stacchetti, Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring, Econometrica, 58 () S.E Equilibrium Investment and Asset Prices under Imperfect Corporate Control.have a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring.

Relatively little is known about the structure of equilibria in these games. These notes survey a few recent ideas on the topic. 1 Private Monitoring: An Example To get a sense of the problems that arise when there is private monitoring, let’s start by working through some variations on.